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COMMENTS
MAKING THE CLASS DETERMINATION IN
RULE 23(b) (3) CLASS ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCON
The 1966 amendment1 of the original rule 232 was designed to substitute a
more functional approach to class action for the abstract conceptualism of the
old rule,3 which gave the court no adequate guide in deciding which of the three
types of class actions-true, hybrid or spurious-applied in a given case.4 Not
designed to set precise guidelines for the handling of a class action,5 it was the
new rule's flexibility which was to be the critical factor in achieving the practi-
cal effects sought; its success, therefore, depended to a large extent on how the
district courts dealt with this flexibility.6
One of the major purposes of the class suit device, the achievement of judi-
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 is set out in the appendix to this Comment.
2. For critical evaluations of original rule 23 see Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contempo-
rary Function of The Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941); Keeffe, Levy & Donovan,
Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Cornell L.Q. 327 (1948); VanDercreek, The "Is" and "Ought" of
Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 273 (1963); Weinstein, Revision of
Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 433 (1960); Note, Federal
Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 818 (1946).
3. Advisory Committee's Note on the Proposed Rule of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 98,
98-99 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Notes]; Wright, Class Actions, 47
F.R.D. 169, 170 (1969). See also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Geo.
L.J. 1204, 1214-15 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cohn]; Newberg, Orders in the Conduct
of Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivision (d), 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 577,
578 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Newberg]; Speech of Charles A. Wright, Third Judicial
Circuit Conference, Sept. 9, 1966, in Proceedings of the Twenty-Nimth Annual Judicial Con-
ference of the Third Judicial Circuit, 42 F.R.D. 437, 563 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Wright Speech].
4. See Advisory Committee Notes 98; cf. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 325, 387-88 (1964).
For historical overviews of class actions see Cohn 1213-28; Ford, The History and De-
velopment of Old Rule 23 and the Development of Amended Rule 23, 32 Antitrust L.J. 254
(1966); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 375-400 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Kaplan]; Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 Va. L. Rev. 629 (1965).
5. See Advisory Committee Notes 99; Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concern-
ing Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 40 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Frankel]; Wright, Class
Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170-71 & n.7 (1970). Indeed, the trial court was invested with broad
latitude in handling each case, in an attempt to insure the procedural fairness lacking under
the original rule. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970); Advisory Committee Notes 106; Frankel,
supra at 45; Newberg 577.
6. One commentator has suggested that if the courts choose not to follow this flexible
approach, the rule should be further amended. Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding
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cial efficiency through the reduction of separate units of litigation, 7 was of par-
ticular import to actions instituted under subdivision (b) (3). Such actions were
designed to ensure economies of time, effort and expense.8 The class action
brought under this subdivision was premised upon a commonality of legal or
factual questions among the class members; 9 the question of binding effect of
the judgment, which had been left open under the original rule, was answered
by providing that the judgment bound those persons who fit within the court's
definition of the class. 10 Under the old rule's spurious class action, absentees
were required to "opt-in" to the class to avail themselves of the judgment. This
"permissive joinder" provision was dealt with in the amendment by providing
that all class members would be bound unless they took affirmative steps to
exclude themselves--"opt-outC--from the class.1
the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 501, 514 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Ford]. Although concern was expressed concerning the potential abuse of such a flexible
procedure (see Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 383 U.S. 1029, 1035 (Black, J., dissenting); cf. Committee on Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit, Supplemental Report, 37 F.R.D. 71,
80-82 (1965)), fears of such abuse of discretion have proved ill-founded. Miller, Problems
of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 334 (1973).
7. See Advisory Committee Notes 102-04; 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice fl 23.02[1], at 71
(1974) ; Frankel 46; Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations In Anti.
trust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Handler]; Kaplan 388-91; Newberg 578; Wright, Class Actions, 47
F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970). The risk to parties of inconsistent determinations by different courts
also was sought to be eliminated. Advisory Committee Notes 102-03; Ford 504.
8. Advisory Committee Notes 102-03.
9. See Wright Speech, supra note 3, at 564.
10. Advisory Committee Notes 99. See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice 9 23.02[1], at
125-26 (1974); Frankel 43; Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 181 (1970). Absent mem-
bers have standing to attack the judgment purporting to bind them in a later suit, and It is
the latter court which determines the res judicata effect of the judgment. Advisory Com-
mittee Notes 105-06. See Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 Va. L.
Rev. 629, 658 (1965); cf. Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action
Judgments, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 589 (1974).
11. One of the abuses which the amended rule sought to correct was the "one-way In-
tervention" sometimes permitted under the old rule, whereby absent class members, who
previously had not opted-in, were in some instances permitted to intervene after a judg-
ment favorable to the class. By removing the necessity of a class member's intervention,
the amended rule eliminated this problem. Advisory Committee Notes 105-06; see New-
berg 578. However, the provision that all absentees were deemed members of the class
unless they exercised their option to exclude themselves was one of the most criticized fea-
tures of the rule prior to its adoption. See Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Judicial Conference, Ninth Circuit-Supplemental Report, 37 F.R.D. 71, 76-77 (1965); part
IV infra. As a practical matter, on the average less than one percent of those sent notice
opt-out, Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been
Sounded?, 25 Bus. Law. 1259, 1266 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Pomerantz], and only 10 to
15 percent of those remaining file claims once liability has been established or a settlement
approved. Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375,
379 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Simon].
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Although it was initially felt that the reasonably strict definition of the
23 (b) (3) action would preclude the institution of a great number of suits un-
der this subdivision,' s (b) (3) has become the primary vehicle employed to re-
cover for financial injury to large groups of potential claimants. 1 3 Because it
provides a forum to victims of securities frauds, antitrust violations, and other
consumer wrongs who otherwise would be without the 6lan or financial resources
to institute individual actions, the class action device has been characterized as
"one of the most socially useful remedies in history."' 4 This function of "taking
care of the smaller guy" has come to be considered an additional purpose of the
rule.13 Increasing criticism, however, has been based on the observation that the
in terrorern effects of being sued by a large class of potential claimants are so
overwhelming that even if a defendant has a fair chance of ultimately proving
the plaintiff's claim to be frivolous, he is compelled to settle prior to trial.10
Whether rule 23 has in fact accomplished its purposes is unresolved. Questions
have been raised as to the potential abuse of the rule 23(b) (3) action by client
solicitation through the use of the notice device; 17 as to whether the absent class
12. Wright Speech, supra note 3, at 567. See Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's
Point of View, 32 Antitrust L.J. 295, 296 (1966).
13. See Katarincic & McClain, Federal Class Actions Under Rule 23: How to Improve
the Merits of Your Action Without Improving the Merits of Your Claim, 33 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 429, 431 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Katarincic & McClain].
14. Pomerantz 1259. See also Ford, supra note 6, at 504-05; Frankel, Amended Rule 23
From a Judge's Point of View, 32 Antitrust L.J. 295, 298 (1966) ; Kaplan, A Prefatory Note,
10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 497, 500 (1969).
15. See Ford 504; Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point ot View, 32 Anti-
trust L.J. 295, 298-99 (1966); Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 497,
500 (1969) ; Katarincic & McClain 430.
16. Handler 9 (referring to the effect as "legalized blackmail"); see Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 559, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J., dissenting) ("Frankenstein
Monster"); American College of Trial Lawyers, Report and Recommendations of the Spe-
cial Committee on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as ACTL Report]; Donelan, The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Class Suit Under
New Rule 23, As Seen by the Treble Damage Plaintiff, 32 Antitrust L.J. 264, 263 (1966);
Katarincic & McClain 430, 432, 437; Pollock, Class Actions Reconsidered: Theory and
Practice Under Amended Rule 23, 28 Bus. Law. 741 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Pollock];
Simon 375; Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com.
L. Rev. 515, 522 (1969).
Although only approximately 10 to 15 percent of those who do not opt-out ever bother to
file claims after settlement has been reached, one judge has noted that: "[als in any litiga-
tion, the pressure on the defendant to buy his peace through settlement cannot be totally
eliminated. It exists in every individual litigation, and we all acknowledge and deal with it
in settlements every day. The trial judge may, however, use his discretion to reduce the
effect of possible abuse in these class actions, and when they are suitably controlled, the
balance of possible abuse against social advantage, it seems to me, is tolerable." Weinstein,
Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 302 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Weinstein].
17. The notice requirement under (c) (2) can be abused by the class representative's
counsel not only by the solicitation of new clients, but also by the solicitation of funds for
fees and expenses from the absent class members. See Manual for Complex Litigation, 1 Pt.
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members actually benefit through the (b)(3) action;' 8 and as to whether the
amended rule in fact has achieved its objective of reducing litigation. 1 Its pro-
phylactic effect of providing the semi-public function of precluding a defendant
from retaining the profits of illegal activity has been both praised as remedying
"socially destructive conduct"20 and criticized as inconsistent with the purposes
of rule 23 by effecting a shift "from compensation to confiscation." 2 '
In apparent anticipation of the myriad of complex problems which this inno-
vative rule would almost inevitably generate, the revisers invested the trial court
with broad discretionary powers to conduct the litigation fairly and deal with
the problems of managing such large, complex cases.22 It is at this level where
2 J. Moore, Federal Practice pt. 1, § 1.41, at 28 (1973) [hereinafter cited by section and
page as Manual]; 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice ff 23.45[1l n.1, at 701 & 71 23.45[31 n.7, at
802 (1974); Katarincic & McClain 430; Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule
23, The Class Action Device and Its Utilization, 22 U. Fla. L. Rev. 631, 639 (1970). The
opt-out provision has led one commentator to observe that the rule is not only a device
for solicitation, but also one for conscription. Pollock 742 (noting that "the great mass of
class members know nothing of the class suit, exercise no genuine choice, and (at least In
consumer class actions) typically receive no share of the proceeds even if the case is ulti-
mately settled." Id. at 744.).
18. See Pollock. It has been argued that the only person who benefits from a class action
is the attorney who brings it. See Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plain-
tiff's Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365, 366 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Blecher]; Handler 9-10;
Katarincic & McClain 430. In fact, the revision of rule 23 led one plaintiff's attorney to
write: "let me... welcome you back to the affluent world of endless depositions, national
discovery programs and large retainers." Donelan, The Advantages and Disadvantages of
a Class Suit Under New Rule 23, As Seen by the Treble Damage Plaintiff, 32 Antitrust L.J.
264 (1966).
Concern has been expressed that since the rule combines great incentive for unprofes-
sional conduct by lawyers with little potential to benefit their clients, it seriously threatens
public confidence in the judiciary and the bar. Simon 390-94. One commentator, however,
has argued that "the instances of abuse by counsel seem to be so few as not to be worthy
of serious discussion." Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313,
334 (1973).
19. Critics have observed that far from reducing litigation, (b) (3) actions have flooded
the courts. ACTL Report 13; Simon 377. Suits are now maintained as class actions which
would never have been brought as individual actions because each individual claim Is too
small. See, e.g., 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice 71 23.45[3], at 802 (1974); Katarincc & Mc-
Clain 435; Pollock 742. But see Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
497 (1969) ; Weinstein 300.
20. Blecher 374. See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice 71 23.45[31, at 808 (1974); Hom-
burger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 642 (1971);
Katarincic & McClain 430; Pomerantz 1260; Weinstein 305. To others, however, this is not
sufficient justification for class actions in light of the tremendous burdens imposed on the
courts and the small benefit derived by class members. See, e.g., ACTL Report 22; Handler
6-8. But it can be argued that whenever the law is enforced effectively and a guilty defen-
dant brought to justice, all society derives a benefit, at least indirectly; benefit cannot be
defined solely in terms of immediate financial gain.
21. Simon 386. See ACTL Report 34; Handler 9.
22. See Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 497 (1969).
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these issues must be addressed and resolved, and where the viability of rule 23
ultimately will be determined:
To the judiciary must be committed the responsibility for balancing all of the com-
peting interests: the innocent defendant should not be raped; the avaricious lawyer
should not be rewarded and the guilty defendant must not be permitted to profiLes
Both fairness to the parties and preservation of the economies of time and
expense can be achieved most effectively through a circumspect approach to the
class determination- 2 4 the point during the litigation at which the court decides
whether to allow the suit to proceed as a class action. It is at this pre-trial stage
where the court must balance these "competing interests" and it is suggested
that a broad-based, closely supervised discovery and pre-trial procedure is the
most effective vehicle for attaining this goal. Without rushing head-long into
the initial class determination, the trial court should ensure that it has before
it an adequate factual foundation upon which to decide whether class treatment
is appropriate, thereby dispelling frivolous or abusive suits at their inception,
and providing those with meritorious claims the forum to which they are entitled.
Although it would be disingenuous to assume that one's disposition toward
the use of these pre-trial procedures would not be influenced by his attitude
toward the class action device generally, it is suggested that the discriminating
application of the various discovery techniques can most efficiently achieve the
balance necessary to accomplish the rule's objectives while preserving procedural
fairness. The major areas of controversy relating to the class determination cen-
ter on the point in the litigation at which the class determination is to be made,
the viability of the "conditional" allowance of the class, the burden and quan-
tum of proof necessary to support a class certification, and the responsibility of
the representative party, the opposing party and the absent class members to
respond to the various forms of discovery. It is through the application of the
various techniques discussed below that, in making the class determination, the
courts can ensure that all the requirements of the rule have been satisfied before
"unleashing the powerful forces which a class determination necessarily pro-
duces."2 5
II. WHEN = CLAss DETERMINATION Is To BE MADE:
T VIABiLITY OF THE "ComNrTIoNmL" CLASs ACTION
Rule 23 sets out the prerequisites which must be met in order for an action
to proceed on behalf of a class,-6 and also authorizes the court to allow class
23. Blecher 374.
24. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 390. "The object is to get at the cases where a dan
action promises important advantages of economy of effort and uniformity of result without
undue dilution of procedural safeguards for members of the class or for the opposing party.
The new provision invites a dose look at the case before it is accepted as a class action and
even then requires that it be specially treated." Id.
25. Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88,92 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
26. Fed. R. Civ.P. 23(a), (b), reprinted in appendix infra.
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status on a "conditional" basis.27 Whether this contemplates a class certification
without the requirements of 23 (a) and (b) first having been satisfied is unclear
and, therefore, the various approaches followed by the courts in this regard
hardly have been consistent.
Some courts have rejected the idea that the class determination should be de-
ferred pending discovery or an evidentiary hearing in order to develop an ade-
quate factual foundation, indicating that the "findings" required by rule 23 may
be sufficiently gathered from pleadings and affidavits.28 But the current leaning
of the courts appears to be towards a more restrained approach in the utilization
of the class action device.2 9 Although the rule itself calls for a class determina-
tion at the earliest practicable stage in the litigation, it is difficult to see how a
bona fide class determination can be made without first having established the
necessary factual foundation upon which to base the decision. Nevertheless, as-
serting their authority to allow class status conditionally and following the rule's
directive that the class determination be made "as soon as practicable," courts
have granted class status on a tentative basis before the plaintiff representative
has demonstrated the necessary compliance with the criteria set out in the rule.
In Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc.,3 0 for example, the court conditionally allowed
class status pending discovery even though the plaintiff had not demonstrated
the requisite predominance of common questions. 81 Other courts have condition-
ally allowed the class action and postponed the issuance of the required notice
to absent class members until the factual issues pertaining to the satisfaction of
the requirements of rule 23 have been more fully developed through discovery.3 2
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1), reprinted in appendix infra.
28. Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins. Co., 43 F.R.D. 169, 172 (D.S.D. 1967); Kronenberg v.
Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see 7A C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1785, at 131 (1972) ("The determination usually
should be predicated on more information than the complaint itself affords.").
29. Compare Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969) ("(11n a doubtful case... any error, if there is to be one, should be committed
in favor of allowing the class action.") with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
30. 55 F.R.D. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
31. Id. at 263. The class action designation ultimately was deemed inappropriate. Selig-
son v. Plum Tree, Inc., 61 F.RD. 343, 345-46 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also Abercrombie v.
Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 388 (SD. Fla. 1972).
32. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 388 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Wolf-
son v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584, 591 (SD.N.Y. 1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271
F. Supp. 722, 728 (NJD. Cal. 1967), modified sub nom. Chicken Delight, Inc., v. Harris, 412
F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 386 (SD.N.Y. 1966). But see
Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the court, discussing
Fischer v. Kletz, criticized such a procedure, stating: "[wlithout notice, the most essential
element of the class action-that those absent be bound-is missing; what was In effect
ordered was a consolidation and not a class treatment. We do not approve of the prac-
tice of declaring an action a class suit with all its attendant problems with a warning that
[Vol. 42
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Unresolved in such cases where class status has been granted without a prelimi-
nary finding that each of the requirements of rule 23 has been satisfied33 is the
question whether the language and concept of rule 23 actually allows for such a
procedure. Does the authority to allow class status conditionally, coupled with
the court's discretionary power under 23 (d), permit the court to defer its findings
as to the satisfaction of the prerequisites of 23 (a) and 23 (b) in initially deter-
mining whether a suit may proceed on a class basis? Arguably, rule 23(c) (1)
renders all class determinations conditional by their very nature; the Advisory
Committee pointed out that the determination "once made can be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits if, upon fuller development of the
facts, the original determination appears unsound. ' 4 Thus, the court is provided
with the necessary flexibility to establish subclasses, or otherwise to deal with the
administrative and judicial complexities which the class suit generates, or even
to revoke its original ruling if facts develop which indicate that the class device
is not the most effective means of proceeding toward an adjudication of the
plaintiffs' claims. But, particularly in the large, complex class actions, the
designation of class status before sufficient factual information has been pre-
sented demonstrating satisfaction of the rule's requirements would seem both
to contradict the language of the rule itself and to frustrate the economies it
was designed to achieve 5 To allow a suit to proceed on a class basis, where a
consideration of all the relevant facts might indicate that it is unwarranted, re-
sults in a substantial waste of time, effort and expense when information sub-
sequently uncovered reveals the impropriety of the class suit. It also increases
the possibility of disproportionate settlements since an affirmative class deter-
mination places the plaintiff in a significantly more advantageous bargaining
it may not so continue. It is preferable to proceed by consolidation and intervention with-
out prejudice to subsequent class action treatment if, upon further development of the
litigation, it appears appropriate. Such a procedure is consistent with the direction of the rule
that class treatment be directed as soon as practicable."
33. For other cases where class status was conditionally granted pending further dis-
covery, see, e.g., Forbes v. Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 61 F.R.D. 416, 418 (D.
Minn. 1973); In re Career Academy Antitrust Litigation, 60 F.R.D. 378, 381 (ED. Wis.
1973); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ; Cusick
v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 317 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (ED.
Pa. 1970); City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232, 235-36 (ED. Pa. 1970);
Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.RD. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. Eissn v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir. 1968) ("It may be that in some situations it
is better at the outset to decide that the proceeding may be prosecuted as a class action and
leave for later resolution some of the debatable matters, such as the sufficiency of the repre-
sentation or the notice to be given, or the feasibility of meeting problems of judicial ad-
ministration."). But see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
414 U.S. 908 (1973).
34. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 3, at 104.
35. See Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 53 F.RD. 216, 220 (SD.N.Y. 1971) ("Here
plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a), and class treatment
, 
whether
conditional or not, is inappropriate.").
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position.36 It is at this stage of the litigation, prior to the class determination, that
the effective implementation of discovery devices is most essential .3 7
IIL. THE QUANTUM OF PROOF NECESSARY TO SUPPORT TIE CLASS
ACTION DESIGNATION: THE QUESTION OF PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS ON
THE MERITS
In order for an action to proceed on a class basis, the plaintiff must satisfy the
court 38 that the class is sufficiently numerous to render joinder impracticable;
that common legal or factual questions exist among the class members; that his
claims are typical of those of the class, and that he will adequately represent
the class. 39 Additionally, in order to qualify as a (b) (3) class action, the plain-
tiff must show that common questions predominate over those affecting only
individual members, and that the class action device is superior to any other
method of adjudication. 40 While rule 23 expressly requires that the class repre-
sentative satisfy these criteria, some courts have required that the plaintiff addi-
tionally demonstrate a reasonable probability of success on the merits as a con-
dition to qualifying for class status.41 Although this requirement generally has
36. The Manual, supra note 17, points out the need for an expeditious class determi-
nation, and emphasizes that "in no event should there be a tentative determination of a
class action request for the purposes of settlement." Id. § 1.40, at 25. "Before any settle-
ment negotiations occur, there should be a class action determination." Id. § 1.46, at 54.
In defense of its position, the Manual notes, inter alia, that until the court has made the
findings required by rule 23 as to the satisfaction of the rule's criteria for class status there
is no assurance that the absent class members will be represented adequately in the settle-
ment negotiations. Furthermore, the "appropriate membership of the class and the Iden-
tity of the members cannot be determined in the absence of an opportunity for hearing and
judicial findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id. at 55.
37. In City & County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971),
the court cautioned that "the prodigious number of class actions presently being filed In
this and all other federal courts with their inevitable concomitant problems of judicial
administration require that careful thought be given to the determination which must be
made." Id. at 623.
38. It is the plaintiffs burden to establish that the requirements of rule 23 have been
satisfied. duPont v. Wyly, [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,381, at 95,312 (D.
Del. Dec. 28, 1973); Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alpha Romeo, S.p.A., 55 F.R.D. 26,
29 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); DiCostanzo v. Chrysler Corp., 57 F.R.D. 495, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232, 234 (E.D. Pa. 1970); 3B J. Moore,
Federal Practice f 23.02-2, at 156 (1974) ; see Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 53 F.R.D.
216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1)-(4), reprinted in appendix infra.
40. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3), reprinted in appendix infra.
41. See Ray v. Rockefeller, 352 F. Supp. 750, 757 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (prisoner petition);
Becker v. Schenley Indus., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 93,669,
at 92,987 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Wechsler v. Tenna Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Tf 92,923, at 90,417 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51
F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825
[Vol. 42
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been imposed where the court has been entertaining the class action question at
a preliminary evidentiary hearing, most courts have rejected such a requirement
both within the context of a preliminary hearing4 2 and without.4 3 The Second
Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen 11I)4 4 rejected the use of a pre-
liminary "mini-hearing" on the merits to determine which party was to bear the
cost of notice to the class after the class determination had been made. Implicit
in its opinion is disapproval of a hearing on the merits for the purpose of decid-
ing the class action issue itself.45 Pointing out that the class determination is
not dependent on the existence of a cause of action,40 and wary of "pre-trying"
the issues prior to the class determination, 4 7 other courts have expressed reser-
vation with regard to such an inquiry into the merits. In their opinion, such
inquiry is more properly initiated through the summary judgment procedure or
by motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.48 Alternatively, many courts
(2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1972); cf. Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 105 (D. Colo. 1971).
42. See Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 & n.4, 428-30 (5th Cir. 1971)
(holding that use of a preliminary hearing for this purpose is reversible error) ; Dorfman v.
First Boston Corp., 17 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 991, 995 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1973); Tober v.
Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74, 85-86 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-
Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 563-64 (NJ). IM. 1972); Lamb v. United Sec. Life
Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 35-37 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co, 55
F.R.D. 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 289 n.2, 294
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Fogel v Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D. 213, 215 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mersey v.
First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
43. See Francis v. Allied Serv. Co., 486 F.2d 597, 598 (Sth Cir. 1973) (dvil rights);
Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 1972); Kaban v.
Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Brandt v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., Civil No. 72-3003 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 20, 1973); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank,
60 F.R.D. 604, 612 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Entin v. Barg, 60 F.R.D. 103, 114 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 81, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Coniglio v. Hlghwood
Servs., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 359, 361 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 347
F. Supp. 1327, 1345 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified on other grounds, 357 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.
Pa. 1973); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 61 (D.N.J. 1971).
44. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). The case is treated in
some detail in Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 426 (1973). See especially id. at 427 nn.10-11 for the full gory history of the
litigation.
45. 479 F.2d at 1015-16.
46. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 US. 950 (1970)
("A suit may be a proper class action, conforming to Rule 23, and still be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action.").
47. See Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 572 (D. Minn. 1968);
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co, 43 F.R.D. 452, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726 (NJ). Cal. 1967), modified sub nom.
Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969). But where "the evidence to
be considered is particularly described and limited, the procedure does not lend itself to a
pretrial of the case." 5 Ga. St. B.J. 278, 285 (1968).
48. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1015-16 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
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have required a minimal demonstration that plaintiff's class status claim is
neither frivolous nor speculative.40
Although the concern which has been expressed with regard to pre-trying the
case or infringing on the summary judgment procedure is certainly valid, the
apparently conflicting language of the various courts is more a semantic than a
substantive difference with regard to the type of evidence to be produced. The
gradational distinctions between the evidence necessary to demonstrate that the
pertinent requirements of rule 23 have been satisfied, that the plaintiff's claim
is not frivolous, and that there exists a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits are often difficult to discern. While the court would not be considering
the evidence for the purpose of prematurely deciding the merits, the fact that
some of the evidence pertaining to the merits would be before the court should
not deter it from considering this information in determining whether the re-
quirements of rule 23 have been met. An informed resolution of the class action
issue usually necessitates an analysis of some of the issues and nature of proof
to be raised at trial in order to determine questions relating to manageability, the
commonality of questions, and whether such common questions predominate. 51
As was recently observed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
"On the merits" is an elusive term at best, not wholly suitable as a guideline in this
situation. In a sense much that a plaintiff alleges with respect to his individual claim
goes to the "merits" of his claim .... It is inescapable that in some cases there will be
414 U.S. 908 (1973); Iiller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1971);
Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74, 85 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v.
Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 563 (N.). Ill. 1972); Fogel v, Wolfgang, 47
F.R.D. 213, 215 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Since summary judgment is an adjudication on the
merits, a defendant who wins this motion can take advantage of its res judicata effects.
See 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice f0.409[1l], at 1007-08 (1974). If the action has al-
ready been allowed to proceed as a class action, this advantage pertains to the entire class.
In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1345 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified on
other grounds, 357 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The Manual, supra note 17, § 2.11, at
77, discourages the use of summary judgment in class actions prior to discovery.
49. Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88, 95 (ND. Cal. 1973); Kohn v. Royall,
Koegel & Wells, 17 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 109, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 1973) (civil rights);
Hawk Indus., Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Andruccl
v. Gimbel Bros., 59 F.R.D. 552, 553 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Hoffman v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D.
86, 91 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 37 (S.D. Iowa
1972); Sol S. Turnoff Drug Distrib., Inc. v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische
Industrie, 51 F.R.D. 227, 230 (ED. Pa. 1970); Cusick v. N.V. Nederlansche Combinatie Voor
Chemische Industrie, 317 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1970); City of Philadelphia v. Em-
hart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232, 234-35 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48
F.R.D. 333, 338 (D.R.I. 1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43
F.R.D. 452, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See also 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice II 23.45[3], at 804
n.14 (1974).
50. See Blecher, Discovery and Trial, 41 Antitrust L.J. 240, 241 (1972).
51. Shaw v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 F.R.D. 566, 568 (D.N.H. 1973).
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overlap between the demands of 23(a) and (b) and the question of whether plaintiff
can succeed on the merits.5 2
While the actual merits of plaintiff's claim would remain undecided for the
purposes of such an inquiry, this "overlap1"5 3 would appear almost inevitable
in a complex class action where "an analysis of the issues and the nature of
proof which will be required at trial is directly relevant to a determination of
whether the matters in dispute are principally individual in nature or are sus-
ceptible of proof equally applicable to all class members." 54 Such a procedure
would not constitute a pre-judgment of the suit.5 5 The resulting class deter-
mination, however, would provide the parties with a firm basis for an evaluation
of the relative strengths of their positions.56 Summary judgment or dismissal
motions may then be appropriate; settlement negotiations may be initiated upon
the basis of an informed estimate of the extent of the class and the potential ex-
posure of the defendant, or further discovery may be allowed followed by a full
trial on the merits. By following such a procedure, a judgment on the merits is
not reached solely because proof pertaining to the major issues is presented.
Since rule 23 expressly requires that the above-mentioned prerequisites of 23 (a)
and the additional requirements of 23(b) (3) be satisfied in order for a suit to
proceed as a 23(b) (3) class action, a court should not be dissuaded from re-
quiring proof on these issues for the reason that some of the same evidence may
be necessary in deciding the substantive worth of the plaintiff's claim. Recog-
nizing this distinction of purpose, the court will ensure compliance with rule
23 and thereby be in a position to establish firmly whether the action before it
falls within the parameters of the rule.57
52. Huff v. N.). Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (civil rights).
53. Such an overlap was evidenced by the court's language in Grad v. Memorex Corp.,
61 F.R.D. 88 (N.). Cal. 1973), where it allowed a rule 10b-5 suit to proceed as a class
action, stating: "Although this court has not preceded the [class action] ruling today with
a preliminary trial on the merits ... it has determined, with the benefit of extensive briefing
and the fruits of the parties' discovery, that plaintiffs' claims are not insubstantial, that
indeed on their face they have substantial merit." Id. at 95.
54. Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 390 (S.D. Fla. 1972). See also Bogo-
sian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 1 74,840, at 95,726, 95,729 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 19,
1973); Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1974 Trade Cas.)
1 74, 875, at 95,950-51 (D. Utah, Sept. 19, 1973).
55. But if every issue has been brought before the court at the preliminary hearing, the
case would then be ripe for a motion for summary judgment. See Dolgow v. Anderson,
43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 83 F.R.D.
664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972).
56. See Weinstein, supra note 16, at 304.
57. The use of a preliminary hearing on the merits, however, has generated support by
the commentators. See National Institute for Consumer Justice, Redress of Consumer
Grievances 31 (1973); Blecher, supra note 18, at 370; Katarincic & McClain, supra note
13, at 437, 439 et seq.; Leader, Threshold Prerequisites to Securities Fraud Class Actions,
48 Texas L. Rev. 417, 427 (1970); Weinstein, supra note 16, at 303-04; 40 U. Colo. L. Rev.
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IV. GATHERING THE INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE CLASS
ACTION DETERMINATION
A. Discovery Among the Parties
In addition to the issues relating to the timing of the class determination, and
the quantum of evidence necessary to support a class designation, there remains
the question of the means through which this information is to be ascertained.
It is the plaintiff's burden to establish that the action meets the requirements
of rule 23. 51 The bare allegation that he has fulfilled these requirements should
not be sufficient to establish class status.5" Since sufficient information necessary
to satisfy the rule's requirements is generally not ascertainable from the plead-
ings and affidavits alone, it is fundamental that some form of discovery is neces-
sary to provide the court with a basis for its judgment as to the efficacy of class
status. What limitations, if any, should the court place on the scope of discover-
able matter at this stage, and how closely supervised should the discovery
process be? The court must strike a fine balance between effecting the broad
purposes of rule 23 and protecting both parties-the defendant from attempts
to stir up unwarranted litigation or efforts designed purely for client solicitation,
and the plaintiff from the tactical abuses to which the discovery process is
readily susceptible.
In City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.,0° the Second
Circuit commented favorably on the use of extensive discovery by means of interro-
gatories which the trial court had directed so as to ascertain information relating
to all the requirements of rule 23 in order to establish a reliable foundation for
its class determination.0 ' Other courts have followed a similarly cautious
approach.0 2 A policy of closely supervised discovery of this nature, where fairly
462 (1968); 1972 Wash. U.L.Q. 588. Indeed the ACTL Report, supra note 16, at 25, sug-
gests that the preliminary hearing for the purpose of determining the substantiality of the
plaintiff's claim should be included in the rule itself.
58. See note 38 supra.
59. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa.
1967) ("[N]o litigant should be permitted to enhance his own bargaining power by merely
alleging that he is acting for a class of litigants."). See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice ff
23.02-2, at 152-53 (1974).
60. 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'g 44 F.R.D. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
61. Id. at 297. The court of appeals pointed out that the trial judge's determination had
been made "[aifter having the nature and scope of the prospective trial thus unrolled before
him, having had an opportunity to examine the interrogatories and answers thereto ... and
after having heard extensive oral argument on the class action issue .... " Id.
62. See, e.g., Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 428-33 (W.D. Mo. 1973);
Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88, 95 (ND. Cal. 1973) (decision to allow class action
reached after substantial discovery); Becker v. Schenley Indus., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,669, at 92,987 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (refusal to determine
if class action appropriate until after some discovery); DiCostanzo v. Chrysler Corp., 57
F.R.D. 495, 499 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Rosenblatt v. Omega Equities Corp., 50 F.R.D. 61, 62
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Reichlin v. Wolfson, 47 F.R.D. 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (plaintiff failed
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and properly employed, can work both to maintain the courts as receptive to
bona fide class claims and to eliminate at an early stage those which either do
not fall within the contemplation of the rule or which can be adjudicated more
appropriately in another fashion.
While the rule "contemplates that depositions or other proof may be utilized
to establish the propriety of the class action," 63 few courts have addressed the
question as to whether any limitations or restrictions should be imposed on the
scope of discovery to which the parties may be subjected prior to the class
determination. While discovery relating to the merits of the action would be in-
appropriate at this preliminary stage, 4 discovery has been allowed with respect
to the class status question itself, including "the nature and extent" of both the
class and the transactions in order to establish the boundaries of the class, "so
long as plaintiffs are [not] abusing the discovery rules so as to harass defendants
.... "65 In Doyle v. Bresler's 33 Flavors, In.,c the court directed that pre-class-
determination discovery proceed on the issues of whether a class existed and, if
so, the dimensions of the class and the adequacy of the plaintiffs as class repre-
sentatives. 7 It is at this preliminary stage that the court must determine
whether and to what extent to allow discovery to proceed. In Branch v. Reynolds
Metals Co.,68 defendants objected to plaintiffs' interrogatories on the ground
that they related to the class allegation and, since the court had not yet approved
class status, that they were irrelevant to the action at that point.0 9 The court
found that if these objections were sustained, it would "place plaintiffs' counsel
in the anomalous position of not being able to sustain its class contentions for
to use pre-trial discovery to establish basis for class action; class action dismissed) ; Burstein
v. Slote, 12 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 577, 579-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (plaintiffs granted right to pre-
trial discovery to determine if class action appropriate) ; Herbst v. Able, 278 F. Supp. 664,
668-69 (S.DN.Y. 1967) (class action determination postponed pending discovery).
63. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp, 49 F.R.D. 35,
38 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
64. The Manual, supra note 17, § 1.40, at 25, recommends that a separate schedule for
discovery on the class action issue should be established if necessary for the class deter-
mination, but it stipulates that this usually should not proceed at the same time as merit
discovery. See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269, 272 (D.D.C. 1972).
65. Burstein v. Slote, 12 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 577, 580 (S..N.Y. 1968).
66. 1972 Trade Cas. 1 74,082 (NJ). I11. 1972).
67. More specifically, the court ordered that discovery be limited to: "1. fa~ll issues
relevant to the particular claims of the named plaintiffs; 2. [t]he issue of whether there is
a class of plaintiffs similarly situated to the named plaintiffs; 3. [tlhe dimensions of such a
purported class of plaintiffs; and 4. [t]he issue of whether the named plaintiffs can ade-
quately represent such a purported class of plaintiffs." Id. at 92,468. See also Margolin v.
First Nat'l City Bank, Civil No. 72-1689 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 1972), where the court granted
defendant's motion to stay discovery "except for limited discovery relating directly to deter-
mination of the propriety of maintaining this action as a class action, and the adequacy of
plaintiff as a class representative ... "Id.
68. 17 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 494 (E.D. Va. 1972) (civil rights).
69. Id.
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lack of evidentiary support, yet unable to adduce such support by reason of its
inability to prove class standing,"70 and ordered the discovery to proceed. Many
courts have implicitly reached a similar conclusion and allowed discovery of
defendants' documents and records in order to ascertain the limits of their
class.71 Although a bona fide class claim should entitle the plaintiff representative
to information relating to the class action issue, in order to avoid abuse such as
client solicitation, the court should ensure that the plaintiff has presented at
least "some evidence" 72 supporting the maintainability of the class action before
subjecting the defendant to the burden of producing large amounts of informa-
tion. As has been pointed out by Judge Mansfield, "the purpose of the pre-trial
discovery rules ... is to enable the parties to prepare for trial with respect to
their own bona fide existing claims, not to determine whether third parties may
have similar claims." a73 Without a "minimal showing of substance" to the class
action contention,74 the plaintiff should not be permitted to compel the defendant
to assume the burden of producing such information or to open its books to some-
one who otherwise would be without right to inspect them. In order to avoid
placing the class representative with a valid class claim in the anomalous position
described in Branch, the court must make a careful examination of the plaintiff's
class allegations at the earliest stage of the litigation. If warranted by a prima
facie showing in the pleadings and affidavits, the court should then allow such
discovery to proceed on the specific issues relating to satisfaction of the rule 23
requirements. Such a procedure would provide the plaintiff with the means of
ascertaining the information necessary to substantiate the class action allegation
and would protect the defendant from the abuses to which the rule may be
susceptible.
This does not mean that the entire burden of discovery rests upon the defen-
dant. The importance of uncovering sufficient information to determine the
viability of proceeding on a class basis also requires that the plaintiff repre-
sentative assume an equal responsibility of responding to requests for infor-
mation. During the course of the Plumbing Fixture Cases,75 the court dis-
70. Id. at 495. In order to permit such discovery to proceed the court tentatively allowed
class status.
71. See Huff v. NJ). Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 712 & n.3 (Sth Cir. 1973) (en bane) (civil
rights); Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1973) (civil rights);
Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972) (civil rights); Hoffman v. Cbarnita,
Inc., 58 F.R.D. 86, 89 (M.D. Pa. 1973) ; Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 294 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Herbst v. Able, 278 F. Supp. 664, 667-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. O'Meara v. United
States, 59 F.R.D. 560, 568-69 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
72. Crabtree v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 43 F.R.D. 281, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
73. Id.
74. Rossin v. Southern Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707, 712 (10th Cir. 1973): "[Plaintiff]
relied upon a theory that discovery and evidentiary bearing were hers as a matter of right,
without even a minimal showing of substance as to her class action claims or any substantial
need. '
75. Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
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missed the plaintiffs' action for failure to respond to interrogatories which had
requested such information as each plaintiff's name and address, the year his
house was built, purchased, and/or renovated, whether the house contained
particular plumbing fixtures, and the name of the manufacturer of such fix-
tures.7u The plaintiffs had claimed to represent a nationwide class of home-
owners, and the court noted that the sanction of dismissal was "particularly
appropriate in complex antitrust litigation ... where efficient and effective dis-
covery procedures are essential to orderly adjudication."7 7 At this stage of the
litigation, all relevant information within the reach of the class representative
should be discoverable insofar as it goes to the issue of the maintainability of
class status.
Notwithstanding the aforegoing conclusions, yet another question remains:
to what extent is the class representative responsible for gathering information
from those members of the class who have not actively intervened in the suit? If
the plaintiff's claim is validly a class action, the identity of at least some of the
class members should be within his reach or he would not have been able
initially to assert that there were "others similarly situated.""8 With the repre-
sentative's own factual data relating to the class motion and that which he is able
to ascertain from a sampling of the purported class members, he should be able
to produce some evidence supporting the maintainability of class status before
the defendant is compelled to produce information. If the plaintiff intends to be
a true representative of his class, this places no extra or unexpected burden on
him. Moreover, it removes the possibilities of his bringing a frivolous class claim,
turning the class action into a device for client solicitation or placing an unjust
and ultimately unnecessary discovery burden on the defendant.
B. The Role of the Absent Class Member
While the above procedures employed with respect to the representative
parties and their party-opponents may oftentimes provide the court with suffi-
cient factual data upon which to base a class action determination, the additional
problem remains as to the status of the absent class members, or potential class
members and to what extent, if any, their participation may be required in the
course of the litigation. Although it invests the trial court with broad discretion-
76. Id. at 16.
77. Id. at 19. "[P]laintiffs' answers to Defendants' Interrogatories are totally inadequate
and fail to provide essential information critical to the determination of which, if any, of
the many plaintiffs in the present litigaton are entitled to recover damages.' Id. at 15. In
Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 17 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1126 (W.D. Pa., Oct.
17, 1973), the court granted defendant's motion to compel answers to questions posed to the
class representatives respecting possible unethical conduct on the part of plaintiffs' counsel
as relevant to the issue of whether a class action should be allowed.
78. In Dennis v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 17 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 126 (D.S.C. 1973), on
deposition plaintiff could name only three other individuals who would be members of the
class. "A bare allegation of numerosity such as this does not meet the requirements of
Rule 23(a) (1), as such is mere unsupported speculation on plaintiffs part." Id. at 128.
Cf. Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968).
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ary power in the development and control of the litigation79 rule 23 includes no
express provision requiring affirmative action on the part of absent class mem-
bers.80 It was the apparent intention of the 1966 revision to ensure absentees
membership in the class unless they exercised their option to exclude them-
selves.8 ' However, in the absence of an express mandate to the contrary, courts
have permitted various forms of inquiry to be submitted to absentees. Such
courts have grounded their authority on rules 23(d) and 23(c)(3), and
authorized such a procedure under two basic circumstances: (1) where the court
deemed such information or data necessary in order to ensure that the founda-
tion upon which the initial class action determination was made is adequate,82
79. Compare the Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 3, at 106-07 with the concern
expressed by Justice Black regarding what he considered to be the excessive power placed
in the hands of the trial judge by the revised rule 23, Amendments to Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure for the United States District Courts, 383 U.S. 1029, 1034-35 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
80. See, e.g., Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333, 338 (D.R.I. 1969);
Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Both
courts rejected contentions that the rule required any affirmative response on the part of
those who had not expressed a desire to be excluded.
81. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 397-98. For a criticism of this "negative option" pro-
cedure see Pollock, supra note 16, at 742-45. The rule's "opt-out" requirement appears to
raise a significant due process question which would be acute in an action where plaintiff
sued numerous defendants as a class-the so-called defendant class action-insofar as bind-
ing the absent defendants to the judgment in an action in which they were never served
with process. See Report of the Federal Court Committee to the Board of Governors on
Proposed Changes In the Civil Rules, 37 F.R.D. 75, 76 (1965).
82. DeMilia v. Cybernetics Int'l Corp., [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. g 94,364,
at 95,233 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1974); Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D.
217, 227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 396 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(court will re-evaluate suitability of class action based on response to notices sent to absent
members); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267, 271-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y.), class action dismissed, (1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L Rep. U 92,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 456 F.2d 1206
(2d Cir. 1972); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 566 (D. Minn.
1968) ("[wlhether the class action status continues somewhat depends upon the response
to notice given pursuant to this order."); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281
F. Supp. 391, 404 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969) ; Harris v. Jones,
41 F.R.D. 70, 74 (D. Utah 1966); see Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp., Civil No. 4338
(S.D.N.Y. April 7, 1972); cf. Forbes v. Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 61 F.R.D.
416, 418 (D. Minn. 1973); O'Meara v. United States, 59 F.R.D. 560, 568 n.2 (N.D. III. 1973);
Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 69 (D.D.C. 1972). But cf. Sirota v. Econo-Car
Int'l, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 94,362, at 95,231 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
1974); Ostroff v. Hemisphere Hotels Corp., 60 F.R.D. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Loves Wood
Pit Barbecue, Inc. v. Bell Brand Foods, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1974 Trade Cas.) ff 74,905, at
96,079 (S.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 1973) (court refused to send proof of claim form to absent mem-
bers prior to decision on merits); Pearlman v. Gennaro, 17 Fed. Rules Sere. 2d 666, 670
(S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1973); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 282
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curlam).
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and, (2) where such information is shown to be necessary to the defendant's
defense on the issue of liability.8 3
The major question to be considered in determining the desirability of the
employment of such a procedure is whether the potential benefit to be derived
from its use is outweighed by the possible deleterious effects on the class action
concept. On the one hand, the accumulation of such information relating to the
class determination may be of assistance in revealing the scope of the litigation,
in reducing the trouble and expense of susequent notices which might be re-
quired, in providing the parties with a knowledgeable basis upon which settle-
ment negotiations may be initiated, and in providing the court with a basis for
an informed re-appraisal of the class action issue or the possible desirability of
establishing subclasses.8 4 On the other hand, there exists the risk of discouraging
persons with otherwise meritorious claims from remaining in the class through the
intimidation generated in a layman by a confusing legal document, or by bur-
dening them with the responsibility of obtaining assistance through counsel-a
result which rule 23 was specifically designed to obviate. Additionally, where
the sanctions of dismissal or exclusion from the class are imposed against non-
responding members, the defendant may be able to employ the procedure as a
tactical device to reduce the size of the class.
The proof of claim form that is mailed to the class member with the notice
of the class action, or the "dual notice" device (whereby the claim form is sent
separately following the notice), have been the vehicles most commonly adopted
by the courts in obtaining information from absent class members. The proof of
claim form's predominant use has been in antitrust actions brought by govern-
mental entities on behalf of other such entities and sub-agencies.85 While the
utilization of the claim form in these cases generally has been restricted to ob-
taining information pertinent to the class status question, 0 the propriety of its
application has been justified on the grounds that the class members were
readily identifiable; that their respective claims were substantial enough to
83. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 US. 921 (1972); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559,
582 (D. Minn. 1968). Contra, Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460, 462
(D. Utah 1972); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971); City of Philadelphia v.
American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 61 (D.N.J. 1971).
84. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
85. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ; Minnesota v.
United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn. 1968); Iowa v. Union Asphalt &
Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir.
1969); cf. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (EJD. Pa.
1968). See Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 3S U. C.hL L. Rev. 337,
351-52 n.80 (1971).
86. See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn.
1968), where the court directed that the requested information include the name of the
claimant, the amount of purchases and dates thereof for which claim was made, the firm
through which the steel was bought, and the end use made of the product.
1974]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
justify the expense of filing the claims; that they were less likely to be confused
or intimidated by the claim form, and that their records of the relevant trans-
actions were readily ascertainable.87
The propriety of the proof of claim device, however, becomes more dubious
when dealing with classes of consumers and other individual purchasers lacking
the resources and sophistication of the more substantial governmental agencies. 8 8
In the Drug Cases, for example, the proof of claim form had been employed with
respect to the governmental entity class, 89 but rejected in dealing with the class
of retail drug purchasers, "none of whom may have a claim large enough to
justify the expense of preparing a proof of claim form until they are assured of
a recovery." 90 It is in this area that the risks of deterring claimants from remain-
ing in the class are most apparent and the proof of claim device is most sus-
ceptible to abuse. The two possible sanctions which may be imposed against a
non-responding member-dismissal of his claim with prejudice and exclusion
from the class-may be criticized as unnecessarily harsh or inconsistent with rule
23.91 However, if applied, they serve to magnify the need to balance the necessity
of such information against the adverse effect the procedure may have on the
purpose of rule 23. Dismissal with prejudice has the double effect of "locking a
member into a class but closing the door to any benefits he might derive there-
from."192 Exclusion from the class, although an apparent reversion to the old
rule's opt-in requirement, bars the claimant's participation in the class but does
not preclude his initiation of an independent action.9 3
87. The court in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D.
Pa. 1968), however, only required that the members of the governmental entity class file a
statement of intent to prove their individual damages in order to recover, stating: "I see
no reason why those class-members who do not elect exclusion from the class may not be
required to take some kind of minimal affirmative action as a condition of ultimate recovery."
Id. at 459. See Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403 (S.D. Iowa
1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1969).
88. But see Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 (D. Utah 1966), where the court al-
lowed proofs of claim to be submitted to individual purchasers of securities with the sanction
of dismissal for failure to respond.
89. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
90. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 282 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). However, the court did ex-
press its willingness to conduct a "sampling" of the claims of class members within a repre-
sentative state or subdivision. Id. at 288.
91. See Blecher, supra note 18, at 372. The Manual characterizes the use of the man-
datory proof of claim as a "clear abuse of discretion." Manual, supra note 17, § 1.45, at 47.
See also 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1787, at 159 (1972);
Patrick & Cherner, Rule 23 and the Class Action for Damages: A Reply to the Report of
the American College of Trial Lawyers, 28 Bus. Law. 1097, 1105 (1973). However, "[bjecause
the proof-of-claim statement may serve an important function, the best approach is to con-
sider the desirability of its use on the basis of the facts in each case." 7A C. Wright & A,
Miller, supra (footnote omitted).
92. Newberg, supra note 3, at 590.
93. Although the excluded class member would retain standing to bring a subsequent
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As a third, and certainly less severe approach, the court in Korn v. Franchard
Corp.9- adopted an "optional" proof of claim procedure, 5 whereby no penalty
was imposed on those non-responding members. Recognizing the advantage
which the claim form provides in determining the size of the class and the
adequacy of representation, Judge Mansfield nevertheless concluded that
"[u] niless and until liability to the class is established or seems reasonably cer-
tain... members should not be barred for failure to track down this information,
even though such a requirement might later be a reasonable condition to their
participation in any recovery, assuming liability is established. ' *6 Wary of
reversion to the disadvantages of the old rule, the court was reluctant to impose
the requirement of mandatory response as a condition to eligibility for class
membership. The court implicitly found the value of the requested information
substantially outweighed by the potential harm to the class action concept, and
ruled that the absent members would be unaffected by a failure to respond.07
suit on the same cause of action-employing the collateral estoppel effect of the prior judg-
ment if favorable to the class-the indifference and suspicion which observers have noted
with regard to such classes would seem to militate against such a possibility. One commen-
tator has noted that, upon request to take the slightest action, the overwhelming majority
of absent class members will decline to respond, irrespective of the merit of their individual
claims: "Eylou are going to find that that person is not going to send in that postcard-
and that is the real world." Panel Discussion, Symposium on Antitrust Class Actions, 41
Antitrust LJ. 321, 339 (1972) (remarks of David J. Shapiro).
There has been commentary supporting the use of the proof of claim device. Pollock,
supra note 16, at 750-51; Ward & Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice,
10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 557, 567-68 (1969) ("A procedure as helpful as that requiring
the class members to state their claims prior to a specific date certainly should not be
condemned until some class member demonstrates that this procedure has indeed prejudiced
his rights." Id. at 568.). But see Committee on Federal Courts, Class Actions-Recommen-
dations Regarding Absent Class Members and Proposed Opt-Tn Requirements, 28 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 897, 904-07 (1973). Compare id at 907-09 (minority report). It seers plausible
to assume that this area of the law will be affected by the recent Supreme Court decision
in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973), wherein the Court held that all
members of the class in a suit based on diversity must meet the jurisdictional amount in
controversy requirement. Presumably, a court will be compelled to make inquiry of absent
class members when jurisdiction is based on diversity in order to determine which of the
absent members in fact are subject to its jurisdiction.
94. 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y.), class action dismissed [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. g 92,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972).
95. Id. at 60. Here, the court grounded its authority to use the proof of claim device on
rule 23(c) (2) requiring the court ultimately to determine who the class members are.
96. Id. Judge Mansfield noted a "fundamental inconsistency in providing, on the one hand,
that a member who fails to request exclusion shall be included in the class and, on the other
hand, that a member who fails to file a proof of claim shall be excluded from any recovery."
Id. (emphasis omitted). However, once liability has been established or a settlement approved,
the proof of claim form has been employed as a condition to monetary recovery. See, e.g.,
Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1972); Manual, supra note 17, § 1.45, at 48.
97. It is interesting to note the results of the court's procedure: claim forms were sent
to over 1,000 purchasers-one-third were returned undelivered, 233 responses were received,
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Once the class determination has been made, a similar analysis is appropriate
with regard to whether absent class members may be required to submit to
interrogatories relating to the defendant's defense on the issue of liability.08
While courts have rejected the use of such interrogatories under the circum-
stances of the cases then at bar,99 they have concurrently recognized, either ex-
pressly or impliedly, their discretionary power to allow the submission of reason-
able interrogatories to class members at appropriate times and for essential
purposesl 00--presumably situations in which the requested information is
of which 77 (representing 111 persons) requested exclusion, and, of those who did not
request exclusion, 80 to 90 percent did not fill out the forms adequately. 456 F.2d at 1207-08.
On appeal, the Second Circuit attributed the results to the fact that the class members were
laymen and confused by the language of the form. Id. at 1210-11.
A similar approach was followed in Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C.
1972). Although a 23(b) (2) class action based on alleged discriminatory employment prac-
tices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.
(1970), the court employed the proof of claim device to provide necessary information as to
the scope of the class and the alleged discrimination, but followed Korn in declining to
impose a bar to recovery for failure to respond. The court recognized the need for such
information to allow it "to rule more intelligently in future determinations regarding the
boundaries of the class, the need for sub-classes, or even a re-evaluation of the class status
designation itself." 55 F.R.D. at 71. More recent cases utilizing the proof of claim device
have followed Korn in declining to make response mandatory. DeMilia v. Cybernetics Int'l
Corp., [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,364 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1974); Uni-
corn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 217, 227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Abula-
ban v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 51 F.R.D. 496, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Forbes v.
Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 61 F.R.D. 416 (D. Minn. 1973). Having con-
ditionally allowed class status, the court recognized the necessity of factual development In
order for it to pass upon "proposed refinements and revisions of the class definition," (id. at
418), and noted that the large, unspecified class presented "an aspect of uncertainty which
should be promptly resolved." Id. Stating that "fairness, economy and efficiency in the ad-
ministration of this action" would be served by the use of the dual notice device, the court
indicated that those class members who do not opt out should take some affirmative action as
a condition of ultimate recovery. Id.
98. Since many courts have adopted the use of the bifurcated trial, separating the
issues of liability and individual damages, questions as to damages may be postponed until
liability has been established and thus would not be relevant in determining the class action
question. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 977 (1969); Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460, 462 (D. Utah
1972); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 67 (D.N.J. 1971). Separate
trials for damages and liability are recommended by the Manual, supra note 17, § 4.12, at
136-38. However, due process questions have been raised as to such a procedure. See Simon,
supra note 11, at 386.
99. Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460, 462 (D. Utah 1972); Wain-
wright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D.
129 (W.D. Ky. 1971) ; cf. City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 61 (D.N.J.
1971).
100. In Gardner v. Awards Marketing Corp., 55 F.R.D. 460 (D. Utah 1972), the pro-
posed interrogatories, relating primarily to the question of damages and the relevant product
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critical to the issue of liability and is unavailable from any other source. The
principal objection is that treating absent class members as if they were parties
conflicts with the design of rule 23, and would necessarily emasculate the rule. 0 1
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,10 2 the Seventh Circuit
addressed this conflict between the competing interests of the absent class mem-
bers in remaining passive and the defendant in having the ability to ascertain
necessary information for its defense. The court held that under certain circum-
stances, absent class members may be required to submit to discovery under rules
33 and 34, and that the sanctions of rule 37 may be imposed to compel com-
pliance with such discovery orders.' 0 3 In so ruling, however, the court stipulated
that "[b]efore ordering such discovery, a trial court must be assured that the
requested information is actually needed in preparation for trial and that dis-
covery devices are not used to take unfair advantage of 'absent' class mem-
bers."'01 4 Although a fair treatment of the apparent needs of the defendant may
call for the response of absent members to certain court-approved inquiries,
imposing the sanction of dismissal with prejudice against non-responding class
members seems unduly harsh. Some of the absent class members actually may
never have received the form; others, although in receipt of it, may have mis-
construed it or have been so confused by it that they declined to take any action
whatsoever, unaware of the resulting penalty. Exclusion from the class would
effectively accomplish the desired result without imposing upon the absentee the
market, were deemed "unnecessary" in light of the court's order severing the issues of dam-
ages and liability. Id. at 462. "[T]he danger of irreconcilable conflicts between the class
action concept and otherwise permissible discovery in certain cases requires that interroga-
tories submitted to the class be authorized only upon a strong showing of necessity or at
least of likely material aid in the resolution of common issues." Id. at 463. In Fischer v.
Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129 (W.D. Ky. 1971), the court noted that some of the interroga-
tories sought information which already had been elicited from class members through
proofs of claim forms which had been authorized previously (id. at 131) and that there had
been no showing of "special necessity" for such discovery. Id. at 133. Cf. Khalil v. R.W.
Pressprich & Co., Civil No. 69-5452 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1972), where the court allowed
defendant to take depositions of absent class members.
101. "The usefulness of Rule 23 would end if class members could be subjected to Rule
33 and forced to spend time, and perhaps engage legal counsel, to answer detailed in-
terrogatories." Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
102. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972) (affirming the dis-
trict court's dismissal with prejudice of the claims of absent class members for failure to
respond to discovery under Rules 33 and 34), noted in 40 Fordham L. Rev. 969 (1972);
40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 842 (1971).
103. 450 F.2d at 1004-05. The court found, in rule 23(d), discretionary power in the
trial court to enter such orders where the discovery is "necessary or helpful to the proper
presentation and correct adjudication" of the action, as long as "adequate precautionary
measures are taken to insure that the absent member is not mislead or confused." Id. at
1005. Cf. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 582 (D. Minn. 1968),
where the court allowed defendants to pose "transaction" interrogatories to absent class
members after the proofs of claim had been filed.
104. 450 F.2d at 1006.
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double burden of dismissal with prejudice. 05 Whatever device a court may
adopt in gathering information from the absent members of a class, a specific
rule of general applicability is difficult to formulate. In each case the court must
balance the necessity of obtaining such information either for its own use or for
the defense to liability, against the potential prejudice to the absentees and to the
class action concept itself.'0 6
Traditionally, the courts have grounded their authority to submit the various
inquiries to class members on their discretionary powers under rule 23(d); 0 7
the sanctions of rule 37 for failure to respond to discovery are limited to parties
to the action.' 08 Although whether the court may impose any sanction on class
members for failure to respond may turn on the answer to the corollary question
of whether such persons are parties to the action, a dispositive resolution of their
status is not to be derived from the language of rule 23 itself. The courts have
displayed no consistency in the application of party or non-party status to the
absentees.10 9 Although it may be argued that the issue is one of academic signifi-
cance only, and that questions as to the propriety of requiring some form of
action on the part of the absentees should be decided on the basis of the facts
in each case, a general perspective may be of assistance in providing appropriate
guidelines for consideration in dealing with specific problems.
The absent class member is bound by the res judicata effect of the judgment
and has standing to appeal a settlement 1 or to attack the judgment collaterally
on the basis of inadequacy of representation."' While his citizenship is not
relevant in a (b) (3) diversity action,112 each class member is required to satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirement." 3 Counterclaims are assertable against
105. See ACTL Report, supra note 16, at 31-34.
106. See, e.g., Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 324-
28 (1973); 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice ff 23.55, at 1160-61 (1974); 7A C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1787, at 159-60 (1972).
107. See cases cited in note 82 supra. But see Korn v. Franchard Corp., So F.R.D. 57
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972). It also has been
suggested that such authority may be based on the provisions of 23(b) (3) (D) as a function
of the court's manageability demands, or 23(c) (4) providing the court with authority to
remold the class. Newberg, supra note 3, at 590-91.
108. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
109. The Seventh Circuit, in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999
(7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972), referred to the absent class members as
"absent parties." Id. at 1005. The Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940),
in dealing with the question of the adequacy of representation of the class referred to the
absent members as "not formal parties," id. at 42; "absent parties," id. at 42, 44, 45; and
"parties who are represented, though absent." Id. at 43.
110. Sertic v. Cuyahoga Lake Carpenters Dist. Council, 459 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1972).
111. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
112. Collins v. Bolton, 287 F. Supp. 393, 399-400 (N.D. 111. 1968).
113. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973), aff'g 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.
1972) ("Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount...." Id. at 512.).
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absent class members,114 although courts have recognized the problems regard-
ing when they may be asserted 15 and whether mention of the counterclaim
should be included in the required notice to the class regarding the class action
suit.1 6 It has been held that absent class members would not be liable for costs
even though they would be bound by the judgment,117 and the courts have
approached questions concerning various forms of communication with absent or
potential class members in diverse fashions."18 While some of these courts have
referred to the absent class members as "parties" or "non-parties," the terms
appear to have been used more for the purposes of resolving collateral issues then
before the court than for a conclusive resolution of the absentees' status.
In the recent case of American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,11 the
Supreme Court held that, where class action status had been denied for failure to
satisfy the 23 (a) (1) numerosity requirement, "the commencement of the original
class suit tolls the running of the statute [of limitations] for all purported mem-
bers of the class who make timely motions to intervene" after the class action
114. See, e.g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), noted in 87 Harv. L. Rev. 470 (1973); Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56
(M.D. Ala. 1973); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
115. Welt v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 5 (NJ. I1. 1973) (ex-
pressing view that "class members who file claims become 'parties' (for the purpose of
Rule 13(a)) and that compulsory counterclaims must then be fied against them or be
barred." Id. at 8.); Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485, 489
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (counterclaims not assertable against individual class members until they
enter to prove damages after liability has been established).
116. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(yes); Abulaban v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 51 F.R.D. 496, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (yes);
Gardner v. Gold Strike Stamp Co., 1971 Trade Cas. U 73,461 (D. Utah 1970) (no-per-
mitted a supplemental notice later with a supplementary opportunity to opt out).
117. Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44, 48 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (holding that
absent class members were not parties and would not be liable for costs even though other-
wise bound by the judgment). But see Deutscher v. Illustrated World Encyclopedia, Inc.,
Civil No. 72-4086 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1974) (including provision in notice that class members
may be liable to share proportionately the costs of the action if unsuccessful).
.118. See, e.g., Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455
F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972) (permitting defendant to negotiate settlements with potential
class members prior to the class determination) ; Bottino v. 'McDonald's Corp., 1973-2 Trade
Cas. ff 74,810, at 95,619 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (authorizing both sides to communicate with po-
tential class members to ascertain factual information relative to the class action issue);
cf. Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Vance v. Fashion
Two Twenty, Inc., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1513 (NJ. Ohio 1973); Merit Motors, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cas. Uf 74,288 (D.D.C. 1972) ; In re Intl House of Pancakes
Franchise Litigation, 1972 Trade Cas. 9 73,864, at 91,627-28 (W.D. Mo. 1972) ("The Court
does not believe that the defendant should be permitted to negotiate, in any way, individual
settlements, such as release or covenant not to sue, or any other device, with the individual
members of the existing class of plaintiffs.").
119. 94 S. Ct. 756 (1974), aff'g 473 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1973).
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had been disallowed.120 Although the Court did not directly address the question
of the absentees' status for the purpose of general application, it pointed out that
once the class action is allowed and the notice is sent, "they are either non-
parties to the suit and ineligible to participate in a recovery or be bound by a
judgment, or else they are full members who must abide by the final judg-
ment. .. ."121 In the case at bar, the Court stated that "the claimed members of
the class stood as parties to the suit until and unless they received notice thereoJ
and chose not to continue."'' Although the language used by the Court may be
limited to the facts of the case, at least inferentially there was a recognition of
the direct relationship which the institution of the class action has on the pur-
ported class member. Remarking that pending the class determination the ab-
sentees were "mere passive beneficiaries" of the action, the Court noted that
"[nJot until the existence and limits of the class have been established and
notice of membership has been sent does a class member have any duty to take
note of the suit or to exercise any responsibility with respect to it in order to
profit from the eventual outcome of the case.' 23 What responsibilities the class
member might be required to undertake as a condition to ultimate recovery in
the event that liability were established was not discussed in the opinion; how-
ever, at that stage, he would no longer be the passive beneficiary of the proposed
class action. The implication is that the role of the absent class member is left
to the trial court. The application of such an interpretation merely serves to re-
emphasize the need for a circumspect approach in the exercise of the trial court's
discretion with regard to obtaining necessary information from absent class
members. Although within its discretionary power to order such discovery, the
court must carefully analyze the need for such information either for its class
determination or for the defendant's defense on the issue of liability. The court
must consider whether the information is otherwise ascertainable from the class
representative, defendant or other source, and whether the employment of such
a procedure may be inappropriate in light of the potential adverse effects on the
absent class members and the class action concept itself.
V. THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
In order to effectuate compliance with rule 23(c)(1)'s directive that the
class determination be made "as soon as practicable"' 2 4 upon the institution of
the class suit, it is incumbent upon the trial court to devise the most expeditious
methods for reaching its decision on the class action issue. However, the court
concurrently must ensure that an adequate factual basis has been established
indicating that the class action requirements have or have not been fully satisfied.
While the Advisory Committee pointed out that this determination rests "on
120. Id. at 766.
121. Id. at 764.
122. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. Fed. R. Civ. P, 23(c) (1), reproduced in appendix infra.
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satisfaction of the terms of [23] (a) and the relevant provision of ... (b),"
the rule itself provides no guidelines for a procedure by which to make the
decision.
As one method of ascertaining whether a particular action is suited for class
treatment, some commentatorsuo0 and courts'2? have endorsed the preliminary
evidentiary hearing, recognizing it as a useful tool for bringing before the court
the necessary information upon which to base its class determination. Although,
in a few cases the class determination has been made solely on the basis of the
pleadings and without the benefit of discovery, 2 8 some form of discovery has
been allowed by most courts.'29 The preliminary hearing is not designed as an
alternative to, or a substitute for, the appropriate party discovery procedures;
rather it is a complementary device at the disposal of the courts which can pro-
vide the means for more ready resolution of the class action issue. At the pre-
125. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 3, at 104. The burden is on the party seeking
to make use of the class action device to establish satisfaction of these prerequisites. See
note 38 supra.
126. See, e.g., Manual, supra note 17, § 1.40, at 22-26, suggesting that at the evidentiary
hearing, the opposing party should be afforded the opportunity to refute the findings;
Blecher, supra note 18, at 368; Kaplan, supra note 4, at 390; Weinstein, supra note 16, at
303-04. The Manual also notes that "[in some cases, where the issues are simple, or are
otherwise fully developed in stipulations or full factual briefings, it is conceivable that the
class action determination can be made without a hearing. But in most class action appli-
cations, the factual issues respecting whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met will be
sufficiently complex to require a hearing." Manual § 1.40, at 24-25 n.22 (citation omitted). See
also note 57 supra.
127. The leading case is Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 196S), rev'd on
other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 53 F.R.D. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972). See, e.g., Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United-Express-
ways, 42 U.S.L.W. 2394, 2395 (7th Cir. Jan. 16, 1974); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d
710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124-
25 (5th Cir. 1969) (civil rights); City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.,
410 F.2d 295, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1969); In re Goldchip Funding Co., [Current Binder], CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,382, at 95,323 (M.D. Pa., Jan. 15, 1974); Abercrombie v. Lum's
Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 388 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52
F.R.D. 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); lilberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Herbst v. Able, 45 F.R.D.
451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
128. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970), on remand, 53
F.R.D. 661, 662 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437, 438 (2d Cir. 1972) (in which the
discovery tools of depositions, production of documents, and examination of witnesses "in
the nature of discovery" were allowed prior to the class determination) ; Branch v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 17 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 494, 494-95 (E.D. Va. 1972) (civil rights); William
Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 49 F.R.D. 35, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
(recommending depositions prior to the court's determination). See also note 62 supra and
accompanying text.
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liminary hearing, the parties argue the class action question before the court on
the basis of the previously discovered information and submitted affidavits. Such
a procedure gives the court the opportunity to resolve the class action issue
within an adversary context, and to reach an expeditious resolution of the issue.
Nevertheless, a few courts, even while allowing party discovery to proceed, have
specifically disapproved of the preliminary hearing prior to the class determina-
tion. 30 Such decisions have been based on the objections that the preliminary
hearing is unnecessarily duplicative of trial,' 3 ' deprives the plaintiff of a jury
trial in cases where he has a right to one,1 82 and imposes an additional burden on
both the court and the parties1 33 However, because of the special problems
facing both the court and the parties in a class action, the critical importance of
either a certification or a denial of class status warrants the scrutiny with which
the court must approach the class action issue through a closely supervised
schedule of discovery together with the more direct means of the preliminary
hearing. The possible injustice to the potential class member by the disallowance
of the class action 34 without a proper consideration of all the facts, or to the
defendant by the allowance of a class action on the same basis, contravenes both
the equitable design of the rule itself'35 and the economies it was intended to
achieve. Although critics have described the process of discovery in connection
with a preliminary hearing as violative of the rule's mandate that the class
determination be made "as soon as practicable," 30 the actual practicability of
130. See, e.g., Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Guar-
antee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 564 (N.D. II.
1972); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25, 40 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Wolfson v. Solomon,
54 F.R.D. 584, 589-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 289 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mersay v. First Repub. Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
131. Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25,40 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
132. Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 564
(N.D. Ili. 1972) ; Mersay v. First Repub. Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
133. See Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Berland v. Mack,
48 F.R.D. 121, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
134. The denial of class status may often leave the small claimant without a forum in
which to present his claim. "There is, in fact, no other available method; no other suits
are pending and this one will die if class suit status is now denied." Korn v. Franchard
Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972). Whether denial of the class action motion is an
unappealable interlocutory order which may sound the "death knell" of the action has
been a controversial subject itself. Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen 1), 370
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) with Hackett v. General Host
Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972) and King v. Kansas City
S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). See also Note, Managing the
Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 426, 428-29 n.17 (1973).
135. Class actions are a creation of equity. See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 376 et seq.
136. Courts have rejected preliminary evidentiary hearings on this basis. See, e.g., Elsen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen III), 479 F.2d 1005, 1016 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S.
908 (1973); cf. Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Fogel v. Wolfgang,
47 F.R.D. 213, 215 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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rendering the decision without a comprehensive consideration of the class action
contention is questionable. A court cannot decide whether a class will be man-
ageable unless and until it has some idea of the limits of the purported class, the
nature of the evidence to be presented at trial, the major issues and whether such
issues predominate over individual questions.13 7 The utilization of the pre-
liminary hearing in conjunction with the discovery process ensures the founda-
tion for a sound class determination upon which the parties may confidently
rely in subsequent negotiations, thereby disposing of the issue as efficiently and
conclusively as possible.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although a rule of procedure as flexibly written as the current rule 23 is
susceptible to the various forms of abuse which have aroused the criticism of
both courts and commentators, this Comment has attempted to deal with some
of the procedures which can be utilized for the proper application of the rule
with due regard for obviating such potential abuses. While it is ultimately in the
hands of the trial judge as to whether the rule, as it is presently written, can
fairly and efficiently accomplish its objectives, it is worthwhile to repeat the
observation of Judge Frankel:
[T]he time when a hard [class] determination is "practicable" as to the propriety of a
class action will obviously vary from case to case. In some cases, discovery may be
necessary in order to ground a judgment as to the extent and nature of an alleged class;
inquiries of one kind or another may be appropriate in order to appraise the adequacy
of representation, the availability of procedures different from and better than a class
action, the extent of other litigation on the same subject, and other pertinent con-
siderations. In such situations, it may not be possible to decide even tentatively near
the outset of the case whether it should continue as a class action. It may be possible
only to formulate a program of discovery and study under as stringent a timetable as
the circumstances will allow, and then to reschedule the subject for determination
under (c) (1).1 38
It is with this flexibility in mind that the above discussed pre-trial procedures
can be employed most effectively by the trial court in reaching a sound class
determination. A suggested schedule for this pre-trial procedure would include:
1. Evidentiary Hearing. The preliminary hearing should be held by the court
in conjunction with the limited discovery of (2). While refraining from reaching
a determination as to the merits of the plaintiff's claim, the court should ensure
that a sufficient factual basis is established upon which to base the class
determination.
2. Controlled Discovery. Once plaintiff has come forward with a minimal show-
ing of substance to his class action contention, a schedule of limited discovery
should be established in order to provide plaintiff with reasonable discovery to
substantiate the class action requirements, to provide the defendant a like
137. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1974 Trade
Cas.) ff 74,875, at 95,950-51 (D. Utah, Sept. 19, 1973).
138. Frankel, supra note 5, at 41-42.
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opportunity to rebut, and to provide the plaintiff with the ability to assertain
essential information from the defendant in order to respond properly to
defendant's inquiries relating to the class action issue.
3. Absent Class Members. Due to the burden they place on the absentee and
the questionable value in most cases, inquiries posed to the absent class members
should be allowed only upon a showing of special necessity where such essential
information is not forthcoming from the parties. Its fairest use probably would
be on a "sampling" basis, and the harsh sanction of dismissal with prejudice for
failure to respond should be avoided except under the most unusual of circum-
stances.
Ultimately, such a circumspect approach would serve to better effect the
administration of justice, the conservation of both judicial time and expense, and
the design of rule 23.139
John J. Madden and Denise G. Paully
APPENDIX
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 23
CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the ad-
judications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
139. Judge Mansfield has suggested recently an approach which would permit limited
discovery to proceed under court strictures; he advocated a cautious approach coupled with
a searching threshold inquiry and analysis, while insuring that the class determination not be
based on the merits. He also suggested the discriminating use of the proof of claim device.
Remarks of Judge Mansfield at the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Nov. 13, 1973.
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class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the finding include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; Judgement;
Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under
this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on
the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall direct to
the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including in-
dividual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable efforL The notice
shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so re-
quests by a specified date; (B) the judgement, whether favorable or not, wvill include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclu-
sion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (1) or
(b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the
court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed,
and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied
accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies,
the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or pre-
scribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evi-
dence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or other-
wise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgement, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they con-
sider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or
otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or
on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allega-
tions as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (S)
dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under
Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised with-
out the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
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